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Abstract
This article discusses and challenges some popular myths and perceptions about inter-
war Yugoslavia in post-socialist (and post-Yugoslav) Serbia. These include discourses
that blame ‘others’ – ‘treacherous’ Croats and other non-Serbs, the ‘perfidious’ west,
especially Britain – and that are also self-critical, of Serbs’ ‘naivety’ as exemplified in their
choosing to create Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War, and of, later, embracing
communism. The article also offers a reassessment of the interwar period, often
neglected by scholars of former Yugoslavia.
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I
One of the bestselling history books published in Serbia in 2007 was a study of
Prince Paul, Regent of Yugoslavia (1934–41), and the ‘truth’ about the coup d’e´tat
of 27 March 1941.1 The Yugoslav government of Dragisˇa Cvetkovic´ (Serb) and
Vladko Macˇek (Croat) signed an act of adherence to the Tripartite Pact on 25
March 1941. Less than two days later, in the early hours of 27 March, the gov-
ernment was overthrown by a military-led coup, which enjoyed popular support,
especially among Serbs. Prince Paul was stripped of his regency, and King Peter II
was proclaimed of age, six months before his eighteenth birthday.2
The book sold widely. Written by two journalists, it had a print run of 20,000
copies, and was published with the ﬁnancial aid of Princess Elizabeth of
Yugoslavia, Paul’s daughter. Its success may be only partially attributed to a
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low selling price; it was more likely due to the book’s main argument. The authors
contend that Prince Paul was an innocent victim of a British conspiracy to push
Yugoslavia into the Allies’ camp, irrespective of consequences, and they falsely
claim that they were the ﬁrst authors to use Paul’s private papers.3 They support
a popular view that the adherence to the Tripartite Pact would have preserved
Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, and would have prevented the Ustasˇa genocide
against the Serbs and the communist takeover at the end of the war. (The Ustasˇas
were an extreme right-wing group installed in power by Berlin and Rome in April
1941 and given control over the Independent State of Croatia – a Greater Croatia,
incorporating present-day Croatia (minus most of the Dalmatian coast, which went
to Italy), Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of northern Serbia. The Ustasˇa regime set
up concentration camps and murdered, on racial grounds, tens, if not hundreds of
thousands of Serbs, Jews and Roma as well as anti-Ustasˇa Croats. The Serbs were
also exposed to policies of ethnic cleansing and forced conversion to Roman
Catholicism).4
If Yugoslavia had not been invaded as a result of the conspiracy against Paul,
goes the same argument, the communists would not have been able to come to
power in 1945. Prince Paul is therefore seen as a doubly tragic ﬁgure: betrayed by
western allies, he was unable to prevent his compatriots falling victims to wartime
genocide and post-war communist dictatorship. Prince Paul’s one error of judg-
ment was, allegedly, granting the Croats autonomy in August 1939, when a
Croatian banovina (province) was established within Yugoslavia; territorially, it
was greater than the present-day Republic of Croatia, and, crucially, it incorpo-
rated a large number of Serbs. In reality, the devolution was a positive development
overall, since it was clear that centralism was not working. Paul’s legacy may have
been largely negative, but this was because he never abandoned the dictatorship
introduced by his cousin King Alexander in 1929 and then allowed his government
to sign the Tripartite Pact, not because he granted the Croats autonomy.
The same revisionist discourse seeks to rehabilitate Dimitrije Ljotic´, a minor far-
right-wing politician in the 1930s, who became one of the chief collaborators
with the Nazis, and General Milan Nedic´, head of a puppet administration in
German-occupied Serbia. Historical revisionism has gone hand in hand with polit-
ical action: there have been attempts to politically rehabilitate both Ljotic´ and
Nedic´. Nedic´’s portrait was even put on display in the Serbian government build-
ing, together with portraits of all Serb prime ministers, but was taken down after a
public outcry.5
Arguments such as these form part of a wider discourse that essentially
claims that the Serbs made a fatal mistake when they liberated other Yugoslavs
– especially the Croats – and created Yugoslavia at the end of the First World War.
The Serbs should have created a greater Serbian state, an option that had been
allegedly available to their leaders during the First World War, but which they
forsook for a greater, Yugoslav ideal, out of noble, if not naive, motivations.
According to this view, in Yugoslavia the Serbs only suﬀered, despite emerging
as victors from both World Wars, unlike the Croats, Bosnian Muslims and
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Albanians, who, despite losing the wars, beneﬁted in Yugoslavia. Paradoxically,
the non-Serbs also destroyed the Yugoslav state, with the help of external forces.
As if the ‘internal treachery’ was not enough, the Serbs have also suﬀered a
betrayal by their traditional western allies, the Americans, British and French.
The authors of the book mentioned at the beginning of the article may not be
academic historians, but that is not to say that the historical discipline has
remained immune from this type of revisionism.6
These ‘stories that Serbs tell themselves (and others) about themselves’, to
borrow from cultural anthropologist Marko Zˇivkovic´, emerged in the second
half of the 1980s, when the disintegration of Yugoslavia began.7 Nationalist
myths among Serbs vis-a`-vis their medieval past (especially the Kosovo myth),
the Second World War and Serbia in socialist Yugoslavia, and the myth of the
Serbs’ victimization by non-Serbs, have been studied extensively.8 However, the
way the rise and ultimate fall of the Yugoslav kingdom has been perceived in
contemporary Serbian nationalist discourse has been largely overlooked by scho-
lars. This is surprising, since the neglected case of interwar Yugoslavia includes
some of the main themes present in well-studied cases such as the Kosovo myth: the
creation of a large, ‘free’ South Slav kingdom, instability caused by internal treach-
ery, a powerful foreign enemy, betrayal by external allies, death of a king-martyr,
and a noble, but ultimately tragic ending, which may be interpreted as both a moral
victory and a sacriﬁce that would lead to a later resurrection.9
This article examines critically some of the main popular perceptions about
interwar Yugoslavia in post-Yugoslav Serbia. This seems appropriate since
recent western scholarship on Yugoslavia is overwhelmingly concerned with the
country’s violent break-up in the 1990s and with post-war developments. Although
there is a near consensus among scholars that the burden of the past was one of the
key reasons for the failure of the Yugoslav state, pre-1980 history is seldom seri-
ously studied. Instead, the past is usually viewed through the present and since the
present is post-Yugoslav, Yugoslavia is regarded as a project doomed to failure
from the start.
Myths about the ﬁrst Yugoslavia present in contemporary Serbian discourse
may be described as follows: (a) even if it was not an artiﬁcial creation, invented
by the Great Powers at the 1919–20 Peace Conference in Paris, Yugoslavia was
doomed to failure from the start, due to the Croats’ treachery, which led to the
Serb–Croat conﬂict; (b) Yugoslavia was created by Serbs only, they were the ones
who sacriﬁced most for the common country, and yet they were the main losers in
Yugoslavia; (c) Croats and other former Yugoslav nations, apart from Serbs, were
separatists who tried from early on to destabilize and destroy the country; (d)
unlike the Croats, the Serbs were traditionally pro-democracy and western-
oriented; (e) if the British and their collaborators had not carried out the 27
March 1941 coup d’e´tat, Yugoslavia would have survived the Second World
War in peace, and in one piece, the Ustasˇa genocide against the Serbs during the
war would not have happened, and there would have been no communist govern-
ment in Yugoslavia; and (f) the communists introduced a dictatorship in
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Yugoslavia and a federal structure, the main purpose of which was to divide the
Serb nation, traditionally in favour of a centralist government.
The term ‘myth’ in this work is used to describe popular and populist narratives
about the past, unsupported by evidence, but sometimes propagated by writers of
historical texts and by political leaders. The relationship between myth and history
is closer than assumed, not least because historians have often created myths that
served some non-scholarly purpose, for example nation-building.10 The aim of this
article is to challenge mythical understandings of the past, but not by simply dis-
missing myths as an ‘incorrect’ interpretation of the past. Rather, an attempt is
made to understand the origins of and context in which myths appear. It may be
argued that understanding the interplay between the ‘truth’ and the ‘myth’ is as
important as emphasizing diﬀerences between the history and the myth.11
II
History is not a book that is normally read backwards, and the history of
Yugoslavia cannot be understood if approached from the perspective of the disin-
tegration and wars of the 1990s. Similarly, interwar Yugoslavia should not be
viewed through the spectacles of the Second World War, when the country was
invaded, partitioned and its peoples involved in a series of civil (inter-ethnic as well
as intra-ethnic) wars that were often combined with wars of liberation. The
Yugoslavia of 1918–41 is best understood if seen in its historical and wider regional
context.
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – as Yugoslavia was called between
1918 and 1929 – was proclaimed in Belgrade on 1 December 1918 by Serbia’s
Prince Regent Alexander, who had taken over from his ailing father King Peter
I in the summer of 1914. The Prince Regent’s proclamation was a response to an
invitation by a delegation of the Zagreb-based National Council of the recently
proclaimed ‘transitional’ State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which had arrived in
Belgrade after a 24-hour-long journey through war-ravaged territory, in order to
seek uniﬁcation with the Kingdom of Serbia, which had just united with the
Kingdom of Montenegro on 26 November.12 With the proclamation of the State
of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, Habsburg South Slavs declared their independence
from the Habsburg Monarchy. Croatia also abolished two institutions that had
been preserved through centuries of foreign rule: sabor (Diet) and ban (governor).
Strictly speaking, it is not therefore the case, as is sometimes argued, that Croatia
lost its historic institutions when it entered into a union with Belgrade. This had
happened just before the uniﬁcation with Serbia, on the initiative of the majority
of the Croatian political leadership (which included some ethnic Serbs, such
as Svetozar Pribic´evic´, one of the leaders of the Croat-Serb Coalition).
Therefore, not only did Serbia not abolish Croatian independence in 1918, but
it may be argued that it was Belgrade which in 1939 re-established the institutions
of ban and sabor, after the Cvetkovic´-Macˇek agreement of August 1939 (see
below).
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The creation of Yugoslavia was not inevitable, and in 1918–19 there certainly
was not a long-established Yugoslav ‘civilization’ and ‘intellectual unity’, as
Yugoslav statesmen claimed at the Paris Peace Conference. However, the peace-
makers were correct that at the end of the First World War a united Yugoslav state
was a fait accompli.13 Yugoslavia was the only realistic option acceptable to the
Serbian government, representatives of the Habsburg South Slavs and the victori-
ous Powers. Already in the early stages of the war, the Serbian government stated
that its main war aim was the ‘liberation and uniﬁcation’ of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes. In 1916 the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasˇic´ was apparently willing
to accept a ‘minimal’ solution: an enlarged Serbia, rather than a Yugoslav state. In
1916 Serbia had been occupied by Austrian, German and Bulgarian troops, while
its government, the king and a decimated army were in exile on the Greek island of
Corfu. Moreover, the Allies put pressure on the Serbian government and the
Yugoslav Committee (London-based Habsburg Yugoslav leaders) to give up ter-
ritorial demands in Istria and Dalmatia. The eastern Adriatic had been promised to
Italy by Britain, France and Russia under the terms of the 1915 Treaty of London –
terms necessary to lure previously neutral Italy to the Allied side.
Was the Serbian government oﬀered a ‘Greater Serbia’ as a compensation for
the promises made to Italy? The Allied governments never even informed their
Serbian allies of the negotiations with Italy that lasted for some six weeks in
spring 1915. The Pasˇic´ government learned of the negotiations with Italy indirectly,
but was unable to inﬂuence them and remained unaware of the exact terms of the
Treaty until after the war. Serbia’s interests were considered, but so were those of
its small ally Montenegro and of Croatia, which in 1915 had been but a Habsburg
province.14 In August 1915 the British, French and Russians asked Serbia to give
up its share of Macedonia – it would go to Bulgaria if it entered the war on their
side – in return for territorial ‘compensation’ in Bosnia, southern Hungary,
Slavonia, the southern Adriatic and northern Albania. Pasˇic´ was furious, com-
plaining to Ante Trumbic´, the Yugoslav Committee leader, that Serbia had to
ﬁght against its allies as well as its enemies. The Russians told him he had to
choose between Macedonia and Bosnia and that he might end up with neither.
In the end Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, sparing the Serbian leadership from
having to make a choice.
Pasˇic´ was not against Yugoslavia (even though he was a Serb, ﬁrst and
foremost), and his thinking must be placed in the context of Serbia’s predica-
ment at the time. By 1917, with the Serbian army revitalized, rearmed and ﬁght-
ing successfully on the Salonika front, Pasˇic´ would be back on the Yugoslav
track. Unlike the Prime Minister, Prince Regent Alexander maintained
a Yugoslav line throughout the war. At a reception in London’s Claridge’s
Hotel in April 1916, Alexander told his British hosts that the Serbian army
fought for:
[the] ideal towards the attainment of which we have striven for centuries. This ideal is
the union in one single fatherland of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are one
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people with the same traditions, the same tongue, the same tendencies, but whom an
evil fate has divided.15
Meanwhile, leaders of the Habsburg South Slavs believed in a union with Serbia.
Even the unpredictable, emotional and sometimes self-contradictory Stjepan
Radic´, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was not against a Yugoslav union.
Radic´’s often cited – and almost as often misinterpreted – speech of November
1918 in the Zagreb National Council, when he warned deputies of the Croat-Serb
Coalition to not rush ‘like geese in the fog’ to Belgrade, was inspired by his oppo-
sition to creating Yugoslavia on Serbia’s terms, but it was not an anti-Yugoslav
speech per se.16 Although in the immediate aftermath of the uniﬁcation, Radic´’s
policies arguably may be described as separatist, the Croat leader, whose party
became by far the strongest Croat party in the interwar period, was not systemat-
ically opposed to the Yugoslav state.17 Radic´, just like his successor Vladko Macˇek,
sought to achieve the widest possible autonomy for a Croatia that would be terri-
torially as large as possible. More than Macˇek, Radic´ believed in a common
Yugoslav identity. Above all a Croat, he was a Yugoslav, too.18
Britain and France were not opposed to the creation of Yugoslavia, and yet they
waited six months before formally recognizing it when the Treaty of Versailles was
signed on 28 June 1919. There were several reasons for the delay, chief among them
the Italo-Yugoslav dispute over Istria and Dalmatia and fears in London and Paris
that Belgrade would not be able to exert full control over southern parts of the
country, where Albanian and Montenegrin guerrillas rebelled. There was also a
degree of mostly social unrest in some Croat areas, while all neighbouring countries
except Greece were involved in territorial disputes with Yugoslavia.19
The United States was the ﬁrst of the Powers to recognize the Serb-Croat-Slovene
Kingdom in February 1919. America’s support of the small nations and their right to
self determination – one of PresidentWilson’s well-known, but oftenmisunderstood,
14 points – suited the advocates of the Yugoslav uniﬁcation (Lenin, too, supported
the right to self-determination, albeit for diﬀerent ideological reasons). Supporters of
the new state sometimes exaggerated the similarities between various Yugoslav
groups in order to secure the Powers’ support; for instance pro-Yugoslav propa-
ganda argued that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes all spoke one language, even though
Slovene was distinct from Serbo-Croat. It is unclear to what extent this was due to
pragmatism and to what extent due to idealism: throughout the interwar period the
oﬃcial name of the language was Serbo-Croat-Slovene. The oﬃcial pro-Yugoslav
discourse argued that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three ‘tribes’ of a single Serb-
Croat-Slovene (i.e. Yugoslav) nation, and that this nation should have its own
nation-state. Members of the three-headed nation nominally practised three major
faiths: Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam. The religious dis-
tinctiveness of the Muslim Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzˇak was recog-
nized, but they were regarded as Muslim Serbs or Croats, although few of them
actually felt Serb or Croat. Montenegrins were regarded – and many regarded them-
selves – as Serbian, while the Slavs ofMacedonia, who spoke dialects that were closer
6 European History Quarterly 0(0)
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to Bulgarian than Serbian, were oﬃcially considered to be ‘southern Serbs’, regard-
less of how they felt.20
The same year the US entered the war – 1917 – Russia was withdrawing, because
of the March (February O.S.) Revolution. This development favoured the pro-
uniﬁcation forces, because Russia had viewed a united Yugoslavia with some sus-
picion and would have probably preferred an enlarged, largely Orthodox Serbia
instead.21 In addition to the Russian and Austro-Hungarian, two more empires
collapsed around the same time: the Ottoman and German. The break-up of the
centuries-old Ottoman and Habsburg states seemed to indicate that multi-national,
multi-confessional and multi-cultural empires were losing a battle with nationalism
and nation-states, at least in Europe. Nationalist movements did not occur in
imperial peripheries only and anti-imperial nationalism was not consigned to ‘sub-
ject’ nations. Post-Ottoman Turkey broke with the imperial past as radically as the
Christian Balkan successor states, while Hungarian nationalism dealt a decisive
blow to the Dual Monarchy. Austria was an exception among the successor states,
having found itself independent more by accident than because of a well-executed
nationalist programme.22
Only in Russia did the empire strike back. The Bolsheviks, who seized power
during the second Russian revolution of November (October O.S.) 1917, managed
to preserve the territorial integrity of much of the vast empire of the Romanovs,
transforming it into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – after a bloody civil
war against the counter-revolutionaries, who were supported by their foreign allies.
The Soviet Union was originally smaller than Tsarist Russia, but it ‘recovered’ the
Baltic states and eastern Poland during the Second World War, while its post-1945
‘informal’ empire spread further into Eastern Europe than ever before.23 In any
case, however unusual it may seem from today’s perspective, this ‘unmixing of
peoples’ in the aftermath of the collapse of empires in the early twentieth century
favoured advocates of a political union of the kindred Yugoslav peoples who had
never before lived in one state.24
III
Yugoslavia was at the same time the least Balkan and the most Balkan state in the
region, if the verb ‘to Balkanize’ is taken to mean ‘[to] divide (a region or body)
into smaller mutually hostile states or groups’ – a deﬁnition which ﬁrst appeared
following the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.25 The creation of Yugoslavia could not
have happened without the ‘Balkanization’ of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
empires, which happened in no small part due to the South Slav question.
However, Yugoslavia incorporated diﬀerent ethnic, religious, cultural and histor-
ical identities, and its uniﬁcation required a process that was the opposite to
‘Balkanization’.
Interwar Yugoslavia was formally a nation-state, but it was also among the
most complex states on the map of the new Europe. Although it was not an
empire, because of its heterogeneity Yugoslavia resembled somewhat its
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imperial predecessors. Perhaps the main obstacle to the creation of an ethnic
Yugoslav nation was the already existing collective identities of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, to mention but the three ‘tribes’ oﬃcially recognized in interwar
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavist discourse was not merely ideological
and dogmatic. Serb, Croat and Slovene identities were not necessarily in conﬂict
with the wider Yugoslav identity, while ethnic divisions did not always coincide
with cultural, regional and socio-economic divisions. For instance, Catholic Croats
and Orthodox Serbs from Dalmatia had more in common culturally than Croats
from Dalmatia and Slavonia, or Serbs from Vojvodina and Kosovo; similarly,
Slovenes in Istria shared more with Croats from Istria than with fellow Slovenes
from Maribor.26 It is also debatable whether diﬀerences between Serbs and Croats
in 1918 were greater than those between Piedmontese and Sicilians or Bavarians
and Hanoverians several decades earlier, when Italy and Germany were united.27
National identities have their history and it is wrong to assume – as is sometimes
done – that the end of the history of national formation of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes had already taken place by 1918. It may be argued that the ﬁnal stage
in the formation of the Croat nation took place – paradoxically perhaps – only
after 1918, within the context of the Yugoslav nation-state.28 If various collective
national identities continued to evolve after Yugoslavia was formed, what hap-
pened to the Yugoslav nation? Could it co-exist with other, ‘narrower’, national
identities? Did it exist in the ﬁrst place?
The belief that there existed a Yugoslav nation was a crucial – though not the
only – factor behind the formation of Yugoslavia, yet even the most enthusiastic
supporters of a Yugoslav nation agreed that it still had to be created.29 The
Yugoslav state, however, never created a dominant Yugoslav nation and that is
probably one of the key factors behind the country’s disintegration in the early
1990s.30 What scholars of former Yugoslavia have usually failed to note is that
various Yugoslav leaders and regimes never seriously attempted to turn
Yugoslavian citizens into Yugoslavs in the ethno-national sense. Out of some 70
years of the existence of Yugoslavia, only for ﬁve years, during King Alexander’s
Yugoslavizing dictatorship (1929–34), did the state attempt to create a unitarist
Yugoslav nation.31
The post-1945 communist-revolutionary government rejected interwar integral
Yugoslavism as strongly as the Yugoslav regime rejected Habsburg-style Dualism
in the aftermath of the First World War. However, socialist Yugoslavia was a
multi-national federation with elements of a nation-state, at least until a greater
degree of decentralization was permitted in the mid-1960s. Post-1945 Yugoslavia
was a federation of six republics and six nations – ﬁve until the late 1960s, when
Serbo-Croat speaking Muslims (living mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzˇak,
in south-west Serbia) were oﬃcially promoted into a constituent nation, thus join-
ing the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Yugoslavia was
also in some ways the South Slavs’ nation-state, because only the six South
Slavonic nations had the right to their own republic and, in theory, to secession.32
Bosnia-Herzegovina was an exception in the sense that it was not merely a republic
8 European History Quarterly 0(0)
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of Bosnian Muslims, but also of Serbs and Croats living there. Not until 1971 did
the Muslims become the largest ethnic group in Bosnia, just outnumbering the
previously largest group, Serbs – according to that year’s population census
there were nearly 1.5 million Muslims, or 39.5 per cent of the republic’s population,
while Serbs numbered just under 1.4 million (37 per cent); at the same time there
were 770,000 Croats (21 per cent).33
The South Slavs were not considered a minority (‘nationality’ in the then oﬃcial
jargon), regardless of where they lived in Yugoslavia. For instance, ethnic Serbs
made up 12 per cent (580,000) of Croatia’s population in 1991, yet they were not a
minority in Croatia, but one of the two constituent nations of the republic, together
with Croats. Ethnic Croats enjoyed a similar status in Serbia, but ethnic Albanians
living mostly in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and in Macedonia were a
‘nationality’, despite numbering over 2 million in 1991, and making up 15.6 and 20
per cent of Serbia and Macedonia’s population, respectively. As an oﬃcial minor-
ity, ethnic Albanians did not have the right to their own republic in Yugoslavia
(this was the status many of them demanded for Kosovo), while Montenegrins, as a
South Slav nation, had their own republic; this despite Yugoslav Albanians out-
numbering Montenegrins by nearly 4:1. The oﬃcial discourse argued that during
the Second World War the South Slavs carried out both a socialist revolution and a
war of liberation; during the war they opted to (re-)join Yugoslavia, which would
be, unlike the interwar Kingdom, a socialist federation united in ‘brotherhood and
unity’. The ‘brotherhood and unity’ ideology did diﬀer from the interwar ‘national
oneness’, but not as much as the post-1945 authorities liked to claim. Post-war
Yugoslavia remained the state of and for ethnic Yugoslavs.
Although Yugoslavia is almost universally seen as a failure in the exercise of
nation building,34 it still promoted, if not created, at least three nations after 1945:
Bosnian Muslims (also known today as the Bosniaks), Macedonians and
Montenegrins. The Yugoslav state, both the interwar and the post-war one, also
played a major role in forming the modern identities of the three ‘older’ nations:
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. During the last years of Yugoslavia the number of
declared Yugoslavs rose markedly. In both the 1981 and 1991 population censuses,
they far outnumbered the Montenegrins and came close to Macedonians and
Slovenes in terms of numbers – unoﬃcially, the declared Yugoslavs were called
the ‘seventh nation’. This phenomenon was paradoxical perhaps, considering that
the state not only did not engage in creating the Yugoslavs, but it in many ways
discouraged its citizens from declaring as such.35 The paradox is even more striking
considering this was Yugoslavia’s last decade, when anti-Yugoslav ethnic nation-
alisms supposedly dominated public discourse. Scholars studying the 1980s and
early 1990s have tended to concentrate, understandably perhaps, on nationalist
leaders, such as Milosˇevic´ and Tudjman, or anti-state movements, such as the
Slovenian-based Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK), the most celebrated member of
which was the alternative band Laibach. However, little attention has been paid to
pan-Yugoslav politicians such as the hugely popular reformist Prime Minister Ante
Markovic´ (incidentally, an ethnic Croat), or to the pro-Yugoslav counterpart to the
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NSK, the Sarajevo-based New Primitives movement, which included pro-Yugoslav
Bosnian artists such as ﬁlm director Emir Kusturica and musician Goran Bregovic´.
IV
It would be wrong to disregard nationalism as a major source of instability in
interwar Yugoslavia. The period was dominated by the Croatian question – the
refusal of a majority of Croats to accept fully Serb-dominated or Serb-style
Yugoslav institutions (the parliament, the Crown, and the Constitution). Because
the Croatian and Serbian nationalisms were so inseparably linked, it may be more
appropriate to argue that a Serb-Croat question was central to an understanding of
interwar Yugoslavia. What was the essence of this question? Put simply, it was in
diﬀerent Serb and Croat visions of a common state. Most Serb politicians, certainly
in the initial period following the uniﬁcation, believed that Yugoslavia should be
centralized, and governed from Belgrade, the capital. Quite understandably, such a
state model was not received enthusiastically by Croats and other non-Serbs, even
though it was not illogical: Serbia was traditionally a centralized state (on the
French model), and unlike today, the Serbia of a century ago was a success
story, at least in the Balkan context. In an age when independent statehood was
the highest ideal among East-Central European nations, Serbia was the only South
Slav state to be independent, with the notable exception of tiny Montenegro, whose
rulers and Orthodox inhabitants in any case had overwhelmingly felt Serb or
closely related to Serbs. In an era when pan-Slavism had a much more widespread
appeal than today, only one other Slavonic nation was independent: Russia. Serbia
was gradually being industrialized and its economy was prospering despite the
customs war with Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century (also known as
the ‘Pig War’, after Serbia’s chief export to the neighbouring empire). In the early
twentieth century Belgrade turned into a regional cultural centre, with some lead-
ing Habsburg South Slav intellectuals and artists spending signiﬁcant time or
moving there (such as, for example, the Croatian sculptor Ivan Mesˇtrovic´,
Croatian poet Anton Gustav Matosˇ and Slovene ethnographer Niko Zˇupanicˇ).36
Even before the 1912–13 Balkan Wars, when Serbia doubled its territory and fur-
ther increased its prestige in the region, the country was viewed by other Yugoslavs
as a South Slav Piedmont, as already noted.37 This prestige notwithstanding, the
Croats and other non-Serbs preferred Yugoslavia to be a decentralized state, fear-
ing Belgrade’s domination.
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to argue that while the Serbs were cen-
tralists, the Croats were federalists, as is commonly done. During the interwar
years the Croatian Peasant Party was by far the strongest Croatian party with
some 90 per cent of the Croat vote. The Croatian Peasants demanded territorial
autonomy for Croatia as well as the autonomy of their identity; in other words,
they sought to establish a Croatia within Yugoslavia and to secure the oﬃcial
recognition of a separate Croat nation. However, there were also Croats who
believed in a unitary Yugoslav nation – some genuinely, others out of pragmatism,
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just like some Serbs opted for oﬃcial Yugoslavism out of opportunism and prag-
matic considerations – and at the same time wished the country to be decentralized.
There were also centralist-unitarist Croats, though not many. Most of the Croatian
economic elite were loyal to the regime in Belgrade.
While the Croatian Peasant Party called for autonomy for Croatia, it never
considered granting autonomy to non-Croats who were eventually included in
the Croatian province under the terms of the August 1939 agreement.38 Not
unlike the Serbs, the Croats were also centralist within the Croatian political
space – both imagined and real. Most Croats probably wished Yugoslavia to
resemble a dual state, not unlike former Austria-Hungary, in which Croatia
would be Hungary to Serbia’s Austria; this despite the failure of Habsburg-style
Dualism in 1918. During the interwar period, the Serbs used terms such as ‘com-
plex state’ and ‘simple state’ to describe what today would be called multi-ethnic
federation and a centralized nation-state, respectively; they believed that ‘simple
states’ were more stable and immune from disintegration. Generally, it is too sim-
plistic to describe any Yugoslav nation as inherently either centralist or federalist.
For example, although Serbs are traditionally inclined to favour centralism as a
form of state, once the Yugoslav framework is removed the picture often changes.
Before 1918, Serbs feared Croat domination in the Habsburg South Slav provinces;
if a mini-Yugoslavia had been established within the Habsburg monarchy, the
Serbs would have wished it to be decentralized, while the Croats would have pre-
ferred political control from their capital Zagreb.39
During the 1930s, all major Serbian political parties came to support decentral-
ization of Yugoslavia, if not outright federalism. Before Vladko Macˇek reached an
agreement with Prince Paul (through Paul’s de facto envoy, Prime Minister
Cvetkovic´) in 1939, he was the leader of a united Serb-Croat opposition and had
called for the democratization of the country and autonomy for Croatia. In
January 1933 Ljubomir Davidovic´, leader of the (predominantly Serb)
Democratic Party, issued a statement calling for the establishment in Yugoslavia
of four territorial units: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Serbian
Agrarians, especially its left-wing faction led by Dragoljub Jovanovic´, were even
more strongly in favour of decentralization. Several leading Serb legal experts, such
as Professor Mihajlo Ilic´, were openly federalist as well as Yugoslav, while even
those intellectuals with more nationalist views, such as Slobodan Jovanovic´, sup-
ported in the late 1930s the establishment of separate Slovene, Croat and Serb units
inside Yugoslavia. Such nuances are generally left out of somewhat simplistic inter-
pretations of interwar Yugoslavia; interpretations which emphasize Serb-Croat
conﬂict, and according to which Serbs were centralists and Croats and other
non-Serbs were federalists, united in their opposition to Serbian governments.
Nor do these popular yet erroneous assumptions take into account the wider
European context. As has already been suggested, the concept of empires – ‘com-
plex’ states – was defeated at the end of the First World War. The nation-state
model was generally seen as more stable as well as more just, in the Wilsonian
sense, since it granted nations the right to self-determination. Throughout
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East-Central Europe a contest between centralists and federalists was waged and in
all but one case the former emerged victorious. The exception was Austria, where
after a long political battle ‘de-centralists’ won.40
It would be equally wrong to reduce the political instability in interwar
Yugoslavia simply to the Serb-Croat conﬂict. The majority of Croats were suppor-
ters of the Croatian Peasant Party, which until 1924 refused to recognize the
Constitution and the monarchy or to take seats in parliament (though the party
regularly took part in elections). Even after the Croat Peasants ended the boycott
and participated in government between 1925 and 1927, things did not necessarily
improve. After a heated debate in the parliament in June 1928, Punisˇa Racˇic´, a
Radical Party deputy (and an ethnic Serb), mortally wounded Stjepan Radic´, shot
dead two Croat deputies and wounded two more. This led to a serious political
crisis and opened the door for King Alexander to introduce royal dictatorship in
January 1929. In October 1934 Alexander was assassinated while on a state visit to
France (together with the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou), by Croat and
Macedonian revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the Serb-Croat conﬂict represented but
one aspect of a complex political contest. The post-1918 constitutional debate may
have turned into a Serb-Croat conﬂict, but there were many other layers of the
political struggle in Yugoslavia which crossed ethnic and even party boundaries.
The relationship between King Alexander and Nikola Pasˇic´ – both ethnic Serbs
– was not good. Alexander prevented Pasˇic´’s election as the ﬁrst Prime Minister of
the interim government immediately after uniﬁcation. Instead, Stojan Protic´, the
second leading personality of the Radical Party, became the Prime Minister. It was
Protic´ who, during the constitutional debate, presented an alternative constitu-
tional proposal that envisaged wide regional autonomies. Yet Protic´’s proposal
failed to win a majority, largely because Pasˇic´ secured support from Muslim dep-
uties, while Radic´’s Croats were boycotting the parliament at the time.41 Protic´’s
example shows that even immediately after uniﬁcation there were leading Serb
politicians opposed to centralism. In addition to the Croatian Peasants, Serb
Republicans and Social-Democrats boycotted the constitutional debate in parlia-
ment, because there was to be no discussion on whether the country should be a
monarchy or a republic, the former being accepted without a prior discussion.42
During the 1920s, leading Serb and Croat parties achieved two ‘national agree-
ments’, as contemporaries named them. The ﬁrst was the Pasˇic´-Radic´ agreement of
1925, which secured the entry of Radic´ and the Croat Peasant Party into the gov-
ernment (of Nikola Pasˇic´) for the ﬁrst time. The second agreement was between
Radic´ and Svetozar Pribic´evic´, and concluded after Radic´ left the government in
1927. This agreement was even more unexpected, given that the two men had been
bitter political rivals since before the uniﬁcation and given that Pribic´evic´ left the
Pasˇic´ government two years previously because of Pasˇic´’s rapprochement with
Radic´. Moreover, Pribic´evic´ had broken away from the Democratic Party in
1924, to form the Independent Democratic Party, because the Democrats’ leader
Davidovic´ had moved closer to Radic´’s anti-centralist position. Yet, the Peasant-
Democratic Coalition of Radic´ and Pribic´evic´ – de facto a coalition between the
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Croats and Croatian Serbs – would last throughout the interwar period and was
the longest lasting political coalition in the entire history of Yugoslavia. These
examples illustrate very well the complexity of interwar Yugoslav politics and
the impossibility of reducing the political contest to its Serb-Croat dimension.
They also show that even the largest party in the country – the People’s Radical
Party – was not in a position to form a government on its own. Instead, the pre-
dominantly Serb Radicals sought political partners irrespective of their nationality
or religion. Pasˇic´ was wrong to believe that merely bringing the Croatian Peasant
Party into government would solve the Croat question. Radic´, just like his succes-
sor Macˇek, was not interested in the spoils of power unless these included auton-
omy for Croatia. In that respect, there was an admirable and principled continuity
in the politics of the interwar Croat leadership, often accused by historians for
making too many U-turns.
V
The Yugoslav political scene became even more complex during the 1930s.
Following the introduction of King Alexander’s dictatorship in January 1929,
political parties were banned for being sectarian and therefore allegedly anti-
Yugoslav. Legal grounding was provided by the Law for the Protection of
the State, which was used in 1921 to ban the Communist Party. Yet, even before
the relaxation of the dictatorship following the King’s assassination in 1934, all the
main parties had renewed their activities and in the second half of the decade they
were allowed de facto to function. The opposition press was permitted to publish,
and the activities of the old political parties were widely reported; the only proviso
was that parties had to be referred to as ‘former’; by the end of the decade even this
proviso was dropped. The regime also created political parties: the pro-government
Yugoslav Radical Peasant Democracy, which eventually became the Yugoslav
National Party, was established soon after the dictatorship was introduced. In
1934 the Yugoslav Radical Union was formed, while the Yugoslav National
Party joined the opposition.
The names of the two government parties clearly indicate that the regime wished
to unite the major political groups into one party, loyal to the Crown, and thus
eﬀectively create a one-party state (its communist successor succeeded in doing this
after the Second World War). In 1929, only one party oﬃcially joined the govern-
ment: the Slovene Populist Party of Anton Korosˇec; other government ministers
were ‘dissidents’ from all other major parties, including the Croatian Peasants. The
Yugoslav Radical Union was formed by the merger of a faction of the Radical
Party led by the new Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic´, the Yugoslav Muslim
Organization and the Slovene Populist Party. The latter two parties were supported
by the vast majorities of Bosnian Muslims and Slovenes, respectively, while
Stojadinovic´’s Radicals were the strongest Serbian political group, although they
did not command an absolute majority of the Serb vote. In addition to being party
leaders, Mehmed Spaho, of the Yugoslav Muslims, and Korosˇec, of the Slovene
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Populists, were also national leaders of Bosnian Muslims and Slovenes, respec-
tively. The same was true of Radic´ and Macˇek in the case of Croats. On the
other hand, no leader with such an undisputed position among Serbs emerged
during the interwar period.43
Stojadinovic´ did not hide his desire to become the overall Serb leader, but there
were other reasons why in the second half of the 1930s he encouraged his followers
to greet him as ‘vodja!’ (leader). His ideology was not fascist, but his fascination
and ﬂirtation with fascism was obvious to contemporaries such as Count Ciano.
Italy’s Foreign Minister believed the Yugoslav Prime Minister was a fascist, if not
one ‘by virtue of an open declaration of party loyalty’, then ‘certainly . . . by virtue
of his conception of authority, of the state and of life’.44 Contrary to popular
wisdom, Stojadinovic´ was neither the ﬁrst nor the only interwar Yugoslav politi-
cian whose followers addressed him as ‘Leader’. The London Times correspondent
from the Balkans reported after the Yugoslav elections of May 1935, which saw a
victory for Bogoljub Jevtic´, Stojadinovic´’s predecessor as Prime Minister, that ‘the
Yevtitch deputies were returned to Parliament, where they greeted the Prime
Minister with cries of ‘‘Vodz!’’ [sic] or ‘‘Leader!’’, so infectious in these days are
the methods of National Socialism and Fascism’.45 Vladko Macˇek was also often
referred to as ‘leader’ (vodja), as was Radic´, who was also known as the ‘teacher’
(ucˇitelj). Like Stojadinovic´, Macˇek too had a paramilitary guard.46
The Peasant-Democratic Coalition joined the Cvetkovic´-Macˇek government fol-
lowing the August 1939 Agreement. Therefore, only Serbia-based opposition par-
ties continued to oppose the government: the Democrats, the Agrarians47 and the
Main Committee of the Radical Party (i.e. those Radicals who did not join
Stojadinovic´’s faction). These three parties had gradually come together in the
mid-1930s to form the (Serb) United Opposition (UO). The UO took part in the
general elections of 1935 and 1938 together with the Zagreb-based Peasant-
Democratic Coalition. The leader of this Serb-Croat opposition on both occasions
was Macˇek.
Political parties and parliament were in a state of crisis even before King
Alexander introduced dictatorship in 1929. This reﬂected the wider crisis of democ-
racy in interwar Europe. In East-Central Europe only Czechoslovakia remained a
democracy throughout the period, while all other countries became authoritarian
(and even the Czechoslovak democracy was not without its limitations).
Yugoslavia, where the extreme ideologies of the right and of the left never
gained strong support, was no exception. After Pasˇic´’s death in 1926, the
Radicals, the country’s oldest and best-organized political party, began to disinte-
grate gradually into a number of factions. A contemporary observer48 pointed out
that the King did not pronounce a death sentence for the parties but rather
announced their death, which had taken place during the long parliamentary
crisis of the 1920s. Pasˇic´’s death and Radic´’s tragic loss of life two years later, as
well as King Alexander’s assassination in 1934, created a power vacuum that was
hard to ﬁll. However, it is usually overlooked that several other political leaders
died in the second half of the 1930s: Pribic´evic´ (1936), Spaho, the Agrarian leader
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Jovan Jovanovic´ (both 1939), Davidovic´ and Korosˇec (1940). Stojadinovic´’s career
came to a premature end when he was replaced by Prince Paul in 1939 and later
interned and deported as a potential Nazi-collaborator. The career of Aleksandar
Stanojevic´, leader of the Radicals’ opposition faction, was also coming to an end,
due his advanced age (b. 1852; d. 1947). Therefore, it was perhaps inevitable that
party politics suﬀered an identity crisis, as several initiatives for the fusion of
parties into supra-political groupings (such as the Yugoslav Radical Union) or
the creation of entirely new parties during the late 1930s showed. Thus, it is too
simplistic to argue that the Communists eradicated the interwar bourgeois party
politics and introduced a dictatorship in 1944–45. The dictatorship, though not a
communist one, had been introduced in 1929 and a major power vacuum had been
created well before the Second World War destroyed most remnants of interwar
political life.
VI
Although King Alexander’s dictatorship failed to create an integral Yugoslav
nation, the regime inadvertently helped bring the Serbs and Croats closer together.
As already mentioned, a Serb-Croat opposition had emerged by the mid-1930s,
united in pursuit of two common goals: a return to democracy and a solution to the
Croat question. Predominantly Serb parties – the Democrats, the Independent
Democrats, the Agrarians and the Radicals’ Main Committee – believed that the
prime aim should be the abolition of the 1931 Constitution – which essentially
legalized the dictatorship – and the reintroduction of democratic institutions;
once democracy was in place again, the Croat question would be solved. The
Croatian Peasant Party believed that the Croat question must be solved ﬁrst,
while democracy could wait.
Despite the disagreement among the opposition parties over prioritizing their
political goals, the regime was seriously shaken in 1937–38. First, a crisis over the
signing of the Concordat that would regulate the position of the Roman Catholic
Church in Yugoslavia broke out in summer 1937. The Serbian Orthodox Church
strongly opposed the terms of the Concordat, arguing, without much justiﬁcation,
that it would place it in an inferior position in relation to the Roman Catholic
Church in Yugoslavia. The same night the Concordat received majority support in
parliament, the Serbian Patriarch died; rumours that he had been poisoned by the
regime quickly spread. Mass demonstrations in Belgrade and other Serbian towns
broke out, but were violently suppressed by the gendarmerie. This was a good
example of a clash between Serbian nationalism and the Yugoslav state, which
historians tend to overlook.49
In the autumn of that same year, the Serb-Croat opposition formed the Bloc of
the National Agreement, demanding the abolition of the constitution and a solu-
tion to the Croatian question.50 The opposition thus sent the government, shaken
by the Concordat crisis, a clear message of unity. The Serb and Croat opposition
leaders agreed to disagree over the priority of their main aims: democratization and
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Croat autonomy. In August 1938 Macˇek visited Belgrade and was greeted by per-
haps as many as 100,000 Serbs from across Serbia. This event and a narrow defeat
by the united opposition list in the general elections of December 1938, led Prince
Paul to conclude that he needed to get rid of Stojadinovic´. That the Prime Minister
increasingly appeared to see himself as a Yugoslav Mussolini only strengthened the
Prince Regent’s resolve. Paul also realized that the success of the Serb-Croat oppo-
sition was due to a growing discontent with the regime across the country, despite
the support in Slovene and Bosnian Muslim areas, as well as the government’s
continued strength in most Serb areas. As events would show, the greatest success
of the united opposition was also the beginning of its end.
VII
Throughout the 1930s Macˇek kept close contacts with the Royal Court, even
during the periods of close cooperation with the Serb opposition parties, and his
relations with Prince Paul were regular and cordial. The electoral defeat in
December 1938 was a turning point: Macˇek concluded that he could not achieve
autonomy for Croatia merely by cooperating with Serbian democrats, while the
Prince Regent acknowledged the danger posed to the regime by the united Serb-
Croat opposition. An agreement between the two was made more likely by
Macˇek’s willingness to postpone, if not actually abandon, calls for the abolition
of the dictatorship. The new Prime Minister Cvetkovic´ negotiated with Macˇek as a
de facto envoy of the Crown; the two men signed an agreement on 26 August 1939,
only days before the Second World War broke out. Yet, external factors alone
could not explain the Cvetkovic´-Macˇek agreement – the internal dynamics of the
Yugoslav political scene played a major part, too.
With the August 1939 agreement and the creation of an autonomous Croatia,
integral Yugoslavism was eﬀectively abandoned only 10 years after the late King
introduced it. Although some Croats criticized the Agreement, many more Croats,
including the leadership of their largest party seemed content. In many ways the
Croatian question was ﬁnally solved, for the time being at least. However, the
creation of the Croatian banovina opened up the Serb question, and led to calls
among Bosnian Muslims and Slovenes for the creation of their own banovinas.
While everyone seemed to blame them for dominating Yugoslavia, the Serbs had
no clearly demarcated territory of their own, while the Croats secured wide terri-
torial autonomy and the Slovenes had been enjoying a free hand in their lands since
1929. Macedonia was considered to be part of the Serbian sphere, as well as
Montenegro and Vojvodina, but Bosnia-Herzegovina provided a real bone of con-
tention between Serbs and Croats. The Bosnian Muslims themselves sought auton-
omy after August 1939.
In addition to the Serbian church, Serb intellectuals, gathered around the Serb
Cultural Club, carried the ﬂag of Serb nationalism in the late 1930s. They were
joined by some opposition politicians, disappointed with Macˇek and his betrayal of
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the democratic opposition. Yet, nationalism failed to homogenize the Serbs. Even
the most vocal critics of the Cvetkovic´-Macˇek agreement did not argue
that Yugoslavia should cease to exist, rather that it needed to be merely restruc-
tured, so that Serbs would have their own banovina, too. Just as most Croats
opposed the 1921 and 1931 Constitutions, many Serbs objected to the 1939
Agreement.
VIII
In spite of relaxing the dictatorship and despite his Anglophile sentiments, the
Oxford-educated Prince Paul was not a democrat, as is often assumed in pre-
sent-day Serbia. Interested in ﬁne arts more than in the art of politics, the Prince
Regent nevertheless displayed impressive political skills. He managed to replace,
seemingly with ease, two Prime Ministers, one of whom, Stojadinovic´, was increas-
ingly displaying autocratic tendencies and was widely assumed to be growing more
powerful than even the Prince Regent.
Prince Paul founded the ﬁrst modern museum in Belgrade – the present-day
National Museum – and spent signiﬁcant time and eﬀort in acquiring, often as
gifts, a large collection of impressionist paintings. He gave the impression that he
could not wait for King Peter II to turn 18 in September 1941, so that he could
leave politics and devote his energies to art. This may well have been true, but Paul
did not have any intention of abolishing his late cousin’s dictatorship. His expla-
nation, that he was simply a caretaker and that he could not weaken the position of
the Crown while King Peter II was a minor, was disingenuous. In 1936, Prince Paul
was advised by the country’s four leading experts in constitutional law that a return
to democracy would not have weakened the young’s King’s position in any way,
but he apparently ignored their expert opinion.51
Paul is sometimes unfairly accused of being a Nazi sympathizer because
Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact during his regency. The Prince Regent was
unquestionably pro-British and did not like Hitler; if anyone among the Yugoslav
leaders at the time was pro-German and pro-Italian, it was former Prime Minister
Stojadinovic´. However, after France’s quick capitulation in 1940 and with Britain
not in a position to aid Yugoslavia in the event of an Italo-German oﬀensive, Paul
believed that the only hope of salvation for Yugoslavia was neutrality. When in
early 1941 pressure from Berlin and Rome grew to such an extent that it became
impossible to continue the policy of neutrality, Paul had little choice but to give in
and instruct his government to sign the Tripartite Pact. The terms oﬀered to
Yugoslavia seemed favourable: in exchange for joining the Pact, the Axis powers
guaranteed the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; Belgrade was under
no obligation to take part in the Axis’s military campaigns; and the Yugoslav
territory would not be used for transit of Axis troops. Moreover, a secret annex
to the treaty promised Yugoslavia the Greek port of Salonika when Balkan borders
were redrawn. Paul was not the only Yugoslav leader who thought that there was
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little choice but to sign the Tripartite Pact. Although pro-British and pro-French
personally, Macˇek was in favour, too, fearing that in the event of war Croatia
would suﬀer most, due to its geographic proximity to Austria, since the 1938
Anschluss, part of Germany.52
Yugoslavia’s international predicament in early 1941 was indeed such that the
country’s leaders had very little, if any room to manoeuvre. It is impossible to say
whether the Nazis would have honoured the terms of the 25 March agreement, but
they broke treaties with far more powerful countries than Yugoslavia – such as the
Soviet Union. Even if Hitler and Mussolini kept their promises, it is by no means
certain that Yugoslavia could have avoided war and disintegration, while its posi-
tion after the war would have likely resembled that of Bulgaria and Romania,
which came under almost total subjugation by Moscow. In a century in which
they made some catastrophic choices, the Yugoslavs, and especially the Serbs,
should be proud that they rejected an alliance with the Nazis and Fascists. The
price for such bravery was high indeed – around one million dead in a country of 16
million, not to mention a high number of wounded and misplaced, a destroyed
infrastructure and economy and the legacy of a civil war which came back to haunt
the Yugoslavs half a century later – but rejecting the Tripartite Pact was the only
right choice, even in retrospect.
There is a popular wisdom, not least in Serbia, that while the Serbs are tradi-
tionally pro-British and pro-French, the Croats are pro-German. However, while
under Stojadinovic´’s premiership (1935–39; the Serb politician was also the Foreign
Minister during the period) the country moved closer to Berlin and Rome, the
Croat leader Macˇek believed in the ﬁnal victory of the western democracies in
their clash with Fascism and Nazism. He refused to leave the country together
with other ministers and the King in April 1941, but he also rejected a German-
Italian oﬀer to become the leader of an independent, enlarged Croatian state, at a
time when not many dared to say no to Hitler and Mussolini. Only after the
rebuttal from Macˇek did the Axis turn to Ante Pavelic´ and his Ustasˇas. Macˇek
refused to collaborate with the Ustasˇas and spent much of the war conﬁned to his
farm near Zagreb; he was also sent by Pavelic´ to the notorious Jasenovac concen-
tration camp for a while.53 At the same time, Macˇek’s party colleagues were mem-
bers of the London-based Yugoslav government-in-exile. Although many,
probably a majority of Croats, welcomed independence, many soon turned against
the brutal rule of the Ustasˇas. During the war the Croats also played a prominent
part in the Yugoslavs’ struggle against the occupiers. The man most responsible for
the success of the Communist-led Partisan resistance was Josip Broz Tito, a half-
Croat (and a half-Slovene). There were even Croats who joined another resistance
movement, the predominantly Serb and royalist Yugoslav Home Army of General
Mihailovic´ (better known as the Cˇetniks). The Serbs may have been traditionally
pro-western and they may have made the most signiﬁcant contribution to the
resistance movement(s) in occupied Yugoslavia, but despite the existence of the
Ustasˇa state, many Croats took part in resistance, too, and many expressed pro-
western sympathies.
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IX
Despite the seemingly perennial crisis during the interwar period, the creation of
Yugoslavia represented a success; it was above all the success of the Serbian elites.
Those same elites, however, were ultimately largely responsible for the failure of the
state they had done so much to create.54 Tragic though it was, historians must
approach Yugoslavia’s break-up in the 1990s with a cool head. The Yugoslav state
was not the multi-cultural haven it was sometimes made out to be by its advocates,
but it was not a ‘prison of nations’ either, as its opponents have claimed. It was by
no means an ideal state as Yugo-nostalgic discourses would have it, and not only
because for most of its existence it was a dictatorship.55 However, Yugoslavia
represented the best and the most innovative solution to the region’s national
questions. Long before the architects of a united Europe, the South Slavs sought
to create a union that would overcome many diﬀerences and to ﬁnd common
ground for the sake of peace, stability and prosperity.
It may be argued that the dissolution of Yugoslavia aﬀected Serbs most and that
they are now suﬀering from an identity crisis more acute than any other former
Yugoslav nation (inasmuch of course as one can talk about collective identities).56
They were the most scattered group across the country and the self-perceived lib-
erators and creators of Yugoslavia. Not unlike Russians, Serbs attempted to build
– and to a large degree succeeded, at least for a while – a large, multinational state,
but in the process failed to create their nation-state.57 Many Serbs understood
Yugoslavia’s disintegration as a defeat of their national policy of the past two
centuries. This is why many of them believed that they were the last true
Yugoslavs, and this was in many ways true; ironically, however, it was their lead-
ership, under Slobodan Milosˇevic´, that dealt Yugoslavia a fatal blow in the late
1980s and early 1990s.
The main aim of this essay was to attempt to dismantle nationalist myths about
interwar Yugoslavia that exist in both public and academic discourse in post-
socialist Serbia. Interwar Yugoslavia remains in the shadow of better-known
debates about Yugoslavia in the Second World War or socialist Yugoslavia and
its disintegration. Yet, misperceptions and myths about the interwar period, and
the Serb-Croat relationship in particular, persist. The main reason for this is a lack
of a genuine debate among historians. After the end of communist, one-party rule,
the blame no longer rests chieﬂy with the authorities. Historians, and not only
nationalist historians, are at fault, some notable exceptions notwithstanding.
They must not be reluctant to challenge nationalist myths and accepted wisdoms,
and must be prepared to face criticism from colleagues and the public and from the
media, which admittedly often looks for sensationalist and simple answers.
Historians should know that simple answers are rare and that sometimes there
are no answers, even less sensationalist truths, such as the ‘truth’ supposedly uncov-
ered by authors of the book about Prince Paul, referred to at the beginning of this
article. Arguably it is more important to ask the right questions,58 even when those
questions might be painful and risk leading to inconvenient answers; perhaps espe-
cially then.
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